Wednesday, August 26, 2009

No Insurance Coverage for Intentional Assault or False Imprisonment; Different Claims and Proof in Trial Court May Have Led to Different Result

In July 2009, the Colorado Court of Appeals held on an issue of first impression that under a commercial general liability policy an intentional assault by employee was not an “occurrence” which triggered coverage, even though the injury, from the perspective of the victim, may not have been “intended.” Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hauser, ___P.3d ___, 2009 WL 2182600 (Colo. App. 2009). The case was brought by a former restaurant employee who had obtained a default judgment against the restaurant corporation (“policyholder”) for negligent hiring, negligent supervision and negligent retention of a manager who had allegedly assaulted her. The former employee had then sued the insurer, which sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that no coverage existed.

The Court of Appeals first analyzed the issues under Coverage A, Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability. The court noted this provided indemnity coverage to the policyholder for sums it becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which the insurance applied. The insurance applied to “bodily injury” only if caused by an “occurrence.” Thus, the court analyzed whether a sexual assault by a restaurant manager who was negligently hired by the policyholder was an “occurrence.” The court held there was no “occurrence” because the conduct was not “accidental.”

The Court of Appeals then analyzed coverage under Coverage B, Personal and Advertising Injury Liability. Coverage B provides coverage for sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal and advertising injury to which the coverage applies. The policy defines “personal and advertising injury” as “injury, including consequential ‘bodily injury,’ resulting from ... [f]alse arrest, detention or imprisonment.” The plaintiffs had argued that the victim’s hiding in a restaurant bathroom during the events leading to her assault fit within this definition.

However, the Court of Appeals found the district court had not made a finding of false imprisonment, but only held the evidence supported claims of negligence, negligent hiring, supervision, and negligent retention against the policyholder. The Court of Appeals held that, because there was no finding of false imprisonment or damages awarded for that tort, the insurer need not indemnify for damages actually awarded. The ruling leaves open the question of whether an insurer might be liable for damages for false imprisonment awarded in a case which pleaded and proved both false imprisonment against the manager and respondeat superior liability for the policyholder.

Post by Wesley B. Howard, Esq.

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

What To Do on Appeal When a Trial or Hearing Transcript is Unavailable

In July 2009, the Colorado Court of Appeals for the first time ruled on what an appellant must show to gain a new trial based on a missing or inadequate transcript of the trial proceedings. In Knoll v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Ins., ___ P.3d ____, 2009 WL 2182592 (Colo.App.2009) the court applied a three part test announced and followed in several federal and foreign state cases, but never before applied in Colorado. The test requires an appellant to: 1) make a specific allegation of error; 2) show the defect in the record materially affects the appellate court’s ability to review the alleged error; and 3) show a C.R.E. 10(c) proceeding has failed or would fail to produce an adequate substitute for the evidence.

Rule 10 (c) tells an appellant what to do if no proceeding transcript is available. It provides that the appellant may prepare and serve a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including his or her recollection. The appellee may then serve objections or proposed amendments.The trial court then settles and approves the matter, and the court clerk includes the resulting statement in the record on appeal.

The Kroll court clarified that, when the record cannot be so reconstructed, a new trial may be ordered “in the interest of substantial justice.” Citing Pierpoint v. Akin, 76 Colo. 478, 479, 232 P. 682, 682 (1925). The appellant must show that a proper reconstruction effort failed, making a new trial necessary. Otherwise, no error will appear and the case will be affirmed.

Post by Wesley B. Howard, Esq.

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

New Clear Limits on Federal Jurisdiction for Compelling Arbitration

In March 2009 the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that unless federal-question jurisdiction exists based on the complaint in the underlying litigation, federal courts cannot compel arbitration when petitioned under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 552 U.S. ____, ____, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009). The Court also held that federal courts may “look through” the petition to determine whether there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction. However, it is the complaint, not counterclaims, which establishes whether or not such jurisdiction exists, said the Vaden court. (Complaints, even though predicated on state law claims, may be recharacterized to arise under federal law if the governing law is exclusively federal. The same is not true for counterclaims.) The holding that federal courts may “look through” the petition seeking to compel arbitration abrogated rulings by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits to the contrary.

The Vaden court’s ruling on the “look through” issue was unanimous, but its determination that the complaint controls was made on the narrowest of margins, 5 to 4. The dissent would have federal courts examine the controversy below framed by the petition to compel arbitration in order to determine whether federal courts would have jurisdiction over the subject matter. In Vaden the bnk’s petition asserted that federal law preempted Vaden’s state law counterclaims. The bank thus argued that the counterclaims should be recharacterized as arising under federal law. The bank thus claimed the right to a federal court order compelling arbitration, since federal jurisdiction existed predicated on Federal Deposit Insurance Act provisions governing interest rates. The bank had obtained a federal district court order compelling arbitration and affirmance by the Fourth Circuit. The four Vaden court dissenters would have found federal subject matter jurisdiction, allowing the federal district court to compel arbitration of Vaden’s counterclaims.

This Supreme Court decision will restrict federal courts examining petitions to compel arbitration of disputes brought in state or federal courts to examining the complaint initiating the litigation sought to be stayed, along with the petition. State court, in many instances, will be the forum of choice for parties seeking to compel arbitration.

Post by Wesley B. Howard, Esq.

Monday, August 3, 2009

EMPLOYEE V. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR - NEW PENALTIES FOR EMPLOYERS

Colorado employers have additional incentive to correctly classify their workers. House Bill 09-1310, effective June 2, 2009, authorizes the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment to investigate complaints about employers misclassifying employees as independent contractors, and permits the imposition of fines and penalties on employers found to have misclassified employees with willful disregard for the law. An employer may be fined up to $5,000 per misclassified employee for the first misclassification with willful disregard. In the event of a subsequent misclassification, the employer is subject to a fine of up to $25,000 per misclassified employee with willful disregard and to being barred from state contracts for up to two years.

The new law also establishes a framework for employers to obtain a nonbinding advisory opinion concerning whether to classify an individual as an employee for purposes of the Colorado Employment Security Act.

Post By Brent W. Houston, Esq.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

HIGHEST COURT HOLDS FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT PROVISIONS EXCLUSIVE

The United States Supreme Court has held that two sections of the Federal Arbitration Act (“the Act”) provide the exclusive grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award on an expedited basis under the Act. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008). The Court noted that agreements seeking to expand or change those exclusive grounds are unenforceable. However, it left open the question of whether federal courts’ authority to manage litigation permitted the District Court of Oregon to vacate an arbitration award for manifestly disregarding the law when the parties had agreed it could apply such a standard and the court had entered an order approving that agreement.

Although scores of federal court decisions over the years have referred “manifest disregard of the law” as a potential ground to vacate an arbitration award, the Supreme Court noted the Act does not so state. The Court found Congress intended that only the four grounds stated in § 10(a) of the Act permit a federal district court to vacate an award. Those grounds are: (1) award “procured by corruption, fraud or undue means”; (2) where one or more arbitrator was evidently partial or corrupt; (3) arbitrators “guilty of misconduct” in refusing to postpone, to hear evidence, or “of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”; and (4) arbitrators exceeded their powers or “so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” See Title 9 U. S. C. § 10 (2000 ed.). The Court also found that three grounds stated in § 11 of the Act constitute the exclusive grounds for modifying or correcting an award. Those grounds are: (1) an evident material miscalculation of figures or mistake describing a person, thing or property; (2) arbitrators awarding on a matter not submitted to them yet affecting the merits of the submitted matter; and (3) imperfection in the form of the award. See 9 U. S. C. § 11.

Hall Street resolved a split in the federal circuit courts over whether these statutory grounds were exclusive when the parties take what the Court called the “FAA shortcut to confirm, vacate, or modify an award”. See 9 U. S. C. § 9. The court noted that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Colorado, had held previously that parties may not contract for expanded judicial review. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F. 3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001). But see Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir.2001). However, four other federal circuit courts had held otherwise and a fifth had agreed with those four in an unpublished opinion. Hall Street thus provides certainty for parties whose arbitration awards are subject to challenge under the Act (provided that the agreement is subject to the Act, for instance as one “involving commerce.”) (9 U. S. C. § 2.) However, the Court noted that it was not saying that the Act excludes “more searching review based on authority outside the statute.” Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406. Parties may, in appropriate circumstances contemplate enforcement of arbitration awards under state statutes or common law where they might argue for a different type of judicial review.

One panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals previously declined to apply the “manifest disregard” standard for determining whether an arbitration award should be vacated. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Cabo, 114 P.3d 60 (Colo. App. 2004) (discussing treatment of manifest disregard of the law in the Federal Circuits). Another very recent Colorado Court of Appeals decision, citing Sheldon, has observed that many courts applying the Act have referred to judicially created reasons for vacating an arbitration award, including an arbitrator’s “manifest disregard of the law.” Ahluwalia v. QFA Royalties, LLC, ___P. 3d ___, 2009 WL 262466 (Colo. App. 2009) (petition for certiorari pending, 2009 S. C. 230). It remains to be seen whether the Colorado Supreme Court will accept certiorari of the Ahluwalia decision in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Hall Street.

The sweep of the Act in extremely broad, since it applies to all contract “involving commerce.” Thus, it arguably covers each and every commercial contract containing an arbitration provision. This would include commercial leases, employment agreements, contracts for the sale of goods and services, and purchase and sale agreements of many and varied types. When the Act applies, state and federal courts alike, under Hall Street, are limited to the statutorily listed grounds for vacating or for modifying or correcting an arbitration award upon application by a party. Hall Street is now the ultimate authority on whether parties are free to contractually alter those statutory grounds. However, many arbitration provisions alter or add to such grounds in contracts “involving commerce”.

The moral of this story is that the law evolves, creating certainty, but able lawyers have proved over the years that “where there is a will, there is a way” to protect and advocate creatively for their clients. Parties and their counsel have proved zealous by seeking to enforce the provisions they have drafted and previously agreed upon, including standards for enforcing awards. Hall Street is most likely not the last word in the age old prize fight. “In this corner we have the challenger, battling to achieve finality by expeditiously resolving commercial disputes through arbitration. And in the other corner, we have the reigning champion, fighting to guaranty fair application of substantive legal rules and principles. May the best person win!”

Post By Wesley B. Howard, Esq.

Monday, July 27, 2009

DENVER'S NEW ZONING CODE

The City and County of Denver is in the final stages of its comprehensive overhaul of Denver's zoning code. A draft of the new code and new map is available here. Currently, Denver's zoning code task force is conducting public meetings in neighborhoods throughout the city regarding the new code. The remaining meeting dates and neighborhoods are referenced here. Following this public review and comment period, the new code will go to the Planning Board and City Council for discussion, public hearings and adoption.

Friday, July 24, 2009

COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE -- "MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL"

In Colorado, covenants not to compete are void as a matter of public policy except in a few limited circumstances. C.R.S. sec. 8-2-113(2). One of the exceptions is for "executive and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel." However, there is no statutory definition of "management personnel," and the Colorado courts have not provided clear guidance for who is "management personnel."

A recent Colorado Court of Appeals decision, DISH Network Corp. v. Altomari, Case No. 08CA1741 (June 25, 2009), has shed some light on the management level and authority a person must possess for him or her to be deemed "management personnel" for purposes of this exception. Altomari was a "mid-level manager" at DISH Newtork having "supervisory authority over fifty out of DISH's 22,000 employees" and some decision-making authority. The trial court concluded that Altomari was not "management personnel" because he was not a "key person at the heart of the business." The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's narrow interpretation of the statute and ruled that the covenant not to compete was not void and could be applied to Altomari. The Court reasoned that the common meaning of the word "management" is not so limited as to include only the top level of management of a company and that excluding persons who "direct, control, and supervise" other employees within a company inappropriately narrows the statutory language and is inconsistent with the plain meaning of term.

Note that the Court of Appeals' opinion has not been released for publication, and therefore a petition for rehearing or a petition for cert. to the Colorado Supreme Court may be pending. Stay tuned!

Post By Brent W. Houston, Esq.